What is the test for wilful blindness?

[20] Unfortunately, at least in my view, however, Kowarsky J.P. went on to make the following statements, still at para. 37: Even if I am wrong in finding full mens rea, there is compelling evidence that he acted with subjective knowledge that the prohibited result would ensue; his suspicions were aroused but he was reckless in that he realised that he was running the risk of committing an offence, and took the chance. See O’Grady v. Sparling (supra) [(1960), 1960 CanLII 70 (SCC), 128 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.)] at page 13. Furthermore, if I am wrong in coming to such conclusions, I am completely satisfied that the prosecution has proven subjective mens rea in the form of wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt. Kowarsky J.P. then restated the requirements of the doctrine of wilful blindness and stated his conclusion that the defendant there “had every reason to inquire but deliberately failed to do so.” He stated his ultimate conclusions in the final paragraph, para. 41, as follows: For all of these reasons I find that the defendant possessed the requisite knowledge to support a finding of guilt, whether he actually knew that he was acquiring a false insurance card, whether he was reckless by proceeding in the face of the risk or whether he was wilfully blind in that he shut his eyes because “looking would fix him with knowledge”. I am satisfied that the prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and there will be a finding of guilty.