Is ensnaring the innocent the sole rationale for the underlying doctrine of entrapment?

However, I do not read Mack to say that ensnaring the innocent is the sole rationale for the underlying the doctrine of entrapment. At para. 28, Lamer J. referenced Estey J.’s earlier decision in Amato v. R., 1982 CanLII 31 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418: Later in the opinion, Estey J. stated at p. 447 that the root of the defence (of entrapment) was the same as that for the exclusion of involuntary confessions: “The integrity of the criminal justice system demands the rule.” Later, at para. 138 of Mack, Lamer J. held that: The absence of a reasonable suspicion or a bona fide inquiry is significant in assessing the police conduct because of the risk that the police will attract people who would not otherwise have any involvement in a crime and because it is not a proper use of the police power to simply go out and test the virtue of people on a random basis. [emphasis added]