The following excerpt is from Ball v. Huezo (In re Huezo), Adv. No. 2:11-ap-02825-RK, Case No. 2:11-bk-35922-RK (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2019):
The debt of an individual debtor arising from "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another" or "to property of another" may be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C 523(a)(6). An injury is "willful" "when it is shown that either the debtor had a subjective motive to inflict injury or that the debtor believed that injury was substantially certain to occur as a result of his conduct." In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1208. If the act was intentional and the debtor knew that it would necessarily cause injury, "willful" intent does not require that the debtor have had the specific intent to injure the creditor. Id. at 1207. "Willful" means "voluntary" or "intentional." Kawaahau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61-62 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, 8A, comment A). The standard focuses on the debtor's subjective intent and not "whether an objective, reasonable person would have known that the actions in question were substantially certain to injure the creditor." In re Su, 290 F.3d at 1145-1146.
The "malicious" injury requirement is separate from the "willful" requirement. Id. at 1146. An injury is "malicious" if it involves "(1) a wrongful act, (2) done intentionally, (3) which necessarily causes injury, and (4) is done without just cause or excuse." In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1209 (citing Kawaahau v. Geiger, supra). This definition "does not
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