What is the test for abusing a trial court's discretion in denying a motion to exclude evidence from two separate sexual assault cases?

In assessing whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we consider the record before the trial court at the time of its ruling. (People v. Ybarra (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1433.) "The factors to be considered are these: (1) the cross-admissibility of the evidence in separate trials; (2) whether some of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case." (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 161.)

Defendant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion. As an initial matter, evidence from the separate trials would have been cross-admissible. The parole warrant for defendant's arrest was based on the alleged domestic violence incident, and evidence defendant attempted to flee and resisted arrest would be admissible in the K.V. case to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt for the prior assault. (See People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 43-45 [evidence defendant fled from

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