What is the legal test for an 8 to 10 month guideline for institutional delay in a criminal trial?

[171] On the other hand, as stated by Mr. Justice Sopinka in Regina v. Morin, supra, the 8 to 10 month guideline for constitutionally tolerable periods of institutional or systemic trial delay “is neither a limitation period nor a fixed ceiling on delay”. The said jurist went on to state that the application of a guideline will also be influenced by the presence or absence of prejudice. He noted that the guideline for acceptable periods of institutional delay might be shortened in circumstances where an accused is in custody or is experiencing restrictive bail conditions. On the other hand, it is noted that in circumstances where there is no prejudice or the prejudice is slight, the guideline might be lengthened to reflect the absence of impairment to the identified rights that section 11(b) of the Charter is designed to protect.

[172] In this case, the defendant is charged with a speeding infraction under a Part I P.O.A. Certificate of Offence. Accordingly, there are no concerns that his right to liberty has been prejudiced by the subject trial delay. Similarly, there is no basis upon which I can infer that the defendant has suffered an impairment of his right to the security of the person occasioned by the length of the trial delay. In this regard, I am reminded of the comments made by Mr. Justice Doherty in his leave to appeal decision in Regina v. Omarzadah, supra, where he advised that while the Morin summary conviction guidelines should generally govern to prosecutions under Part I of the P.O.A., even those guidelines should not necessarily be strictly applied. He went on to state as follows: …It must be acknowledged that any ‘stigma’ arising out of the delay in the trial of charges like speeding in virtually non-existent. In allocating finite resources, the state is entitled to give some priority to the speedy resolution of more serious allegations.