The following excerpt is from Tomoya Kawakita v. United States, 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1951):
Appellant relies strongly on Bollenbach v. United States, 1946, 326 U.S. 607, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350. In that case a conviction was reversed because on inquiry from the jury, the trial judge gave an instruction which stated the substantive law involved incorrectly. That question is not presented in this case. Nor are we faced with the problem presented in Brasfield v. United States, 1926, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345, where the court held that an inquiry by the trial judge to a jury unable to agree, asking the extent of its division numerically, was ground for reversal, its tendency being coercive. The trial judge in the case before us cautioned the jury repeatedly against revealing their numerical division.
In Hyde v. United States, 1912, 225 U.S. 347, 382, 32 S.Ct. 793, 807, 56 L.Ed. 1114, it was contended that the verdict was a result of coercion by the court. The jury had returned to the courtroom and the foreman had announced that they were unable to agree. The court instructed the jury to retire for further deliberation, and make another effort to agree upon a verdict, charging them: "* * * that should they render a verdict, it must be one to which they all freely agreed; that the law would not recognize a coerced verdict or one which was not the free expression of the views and opinions of the jurymen, and that if, after another conscientious effort, the jury still fail to agree, they should return to the court and so state. That it was not the purpose of the court to unduly prolong their deliberations, and that if they could not conscientiously and freely agree upon a verdict, they would be discharged."
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