Does the use of an undercover agent in a criminal case violate the Miranda waiver?

The incriminating statements obtained from defendant after he had invoked his rights were not the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent. Defendant was speaking freely and voluntarily to a person he believed to be a fellow detainee and gang member. "Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated atmosphere' and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect." (Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 296.) "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner." (Id. at p. 297; accord, People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 284.)

We conclude the incriminating statements made by defendant to the undercover agent were voluntary. When he spoke with the agent, defendant was not "faced with the coercive combination of custodial status and an interrogation the suspect understands as official." (People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 685.) As such, there was no need for obtaining a waiver from defendant, nor was the presence of counsel required. The use of the undercover agent did not violate the rule announced in Edwards, nor violate defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination. The court did not err in admitting defendant's statements.

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