What is the standard of reasonable medical probability in asbestos litigation?

Although the standard of "reasonable medical probability" was adopted in one decision involving a carcinogenic pharmaceutical (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402, 209 Cal.Rptr. 456), it represents a new approach to causation in asbestos cases, and one which finds no close precedent in other jurisdictions. The language is poorly suited to this area of litigation, which is marked by formidable problems of proof because of the delayed onset of symptoms and the typical industrial environment involving multiple exposures to various asbestos products over a period of time. An injured plaintiff's case against a particular supplier commonly rests on vague and fading memories and more or less tenuous circumstantial evidence. A standard requiring "reasonable medical probability" threatens to raise unreasonable practical obstacles to the plaintiff's prospects of recovery. In the case at bar, I do not think Lineaweaver presented evidence satisfying such a standard.