What is the legal test for waiving time on a motion to grant a defendant a speedy trial?

The state constitutional right to a speedy trial "'"serves a three-fold purpose . . . ."' [Citation.] '"It protects the accused . . . against prolonged imprisonment; it relieves him of the anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation of crime; and . . . it prevents him from being 'exposed to the hazard of a trial, after so great a lapse of time' that 'the means of proving his innocence may not be within his reach'as, for instance, by the loss of witnesses or the dulling of memory."' [Citation.] The question posed in evaluating a speedy trial claim is whether delay at the state's hands unreasonably prejudices these interests. [Citations.] The test is necessarily a balancing one: 'prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay must be weighed against justification for the delay.' [Citation.]" (Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540.)

Similarly, once the federal constitutional speedy trial right attaches, courts balance four criteria to determine whether the right has been violated: (1) the length of the delay; (2) whether the government or the defendant is more to blame for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial in due course; and (4) whether the defendant suffered prejudice from the delay. (Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S.

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647, 651-652; Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 90.) Under the federal Constitution, an uncommonly long delay creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. (People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, 942.) In contrast, when only the state constitutional speedy trial right applies, the defendant has the initial burden to affirmatively show prejudice; the burden then shifts to the prosecution to show justification for the delay; and then the court weighs the justification against the actual prejudice suffered by the defendant. (Ibid.)

The length of the delay "is actually a double enquiry. Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay, [citation] since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a 'speedy' trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. [Citation.] This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because . . . the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time." (Doggett v. United States, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 651-652.)⁶ By requesting continuances or waiving time, a defendant relinquishes the federal right to a

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