How have courts dealt with a disparate allowance of credit for actual time in confinement?

¹ Respondent asserts that "the distinction drawn" by the amendments in question "does not involve similarly situated classes of inmates." But apart from a passing attribution to People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 885, 72 P.3d 820 (Floyd ), no argument is offered in support of this premise. That decision, which we discuss in somewhat greater detail below, did not adopt, let alone rest on, the premise attributed to it by respondent. Rather the court found a rational basis for the classificationas do we.

² Also dealing with a disparate allowance of credit for actual time in confinement was People ex rel. Carroll v. Frye (1966) 221 N.E.2d 262, 35 Ill.2d 604, which, as defendant notes, was cited in Kapperman, supra, at page 547, footnote 6, 114 Cal.Rptr. 97, 522 P.2d 657. The central concern there was a potential constitutional infirmity in denying credit for such confinement in light of the operation of the state's bail law, which meant that persons unable to afford bail "were required to serve longer periods of imprisonment than those who were financially able to provide bail." (Id. at p. 264.) The statute under scrutiny had been enacted to remedy this disparity, but was made operational only as to persons sentenced after it took effect. The court declared this limitation unconstitutional as applied to offenses, such as the defendant's, which "carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment." (Ibid. ) As to such offenses the court found the state's sole justification for the limitation fanciful. (See id. at p. 264.) In the absence of any other apparent purpose, the limitation could not stand. (Id. at p. 265.)