Does the term "maliciously" need to be changed to include intent to shoot at a building?

In People v. Chavira (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 988, 992-993, 83 Cal.Rptr. 851, and People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 431-433, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, the defendants argued they could not be convicted of violating section 246, because they did not shoot "at" a building. In each case, the court concluded the evidence was sufficient to establish the intent to hit the building, because the defendant's actions were done with a reckless disregard of their probable consequences (People v. Chavira, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at p. 993, 83 Cal.Rptr. 851; People v. Cruz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 433, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148). The court in Cruz went a step further and concluded that section 246 does not require an intent to strike a building. (People v. Cruz, supra, at p. 433, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148.) These cases concern that element of a violation of section 246 that requires a showing that a defendant unlawfully discharged a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, not that portion of the offense that requires that the act was done maliciously. The cases on which defendant relies do not create a new definition for the term "maliciously" as used in the statute.

Defendant also directs us to People v. White (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1299, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 259. The holding of that case is that section 246 is a crime of moral turpitude that may be used for purposes of impeachment. (Id. at p. 1301, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 259.) A person who shoots into an inhabited dwelling demonstrates wanton disregard for the life of those inside of it. (Id. at p. 1304, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 259.) This case does not alter the statutory definition of "maliciously" as used in section 246. The trial court did not err in providing the standard CALJIC instruction on malice.