Does "knowingly" mean with knowledge of the crime?

Defendant contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to define "knowingly" for the jury. Defendant contends "knowingly" has a technical meaning peculiar to the law, so that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to define "knowingly." (See People v. Valenzuela (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 381, 393, 222 Cal.Rptr. 405 [requiring definition of "assault"].) Defendant contends the trial court should have given CALJIC No. 1.21, which reads in pertinent part as follows: "The word 'knowingly,' means with knowledge of the existence of the facts in question. Knowledge of the unlawfulness of any act or omission is not required."

[217 Cal.App.3d 681] CALJIC No. 1.21 is based on Penal Code section 7. The instruction narrows the common definition of "knowingly" by excluding knowledge of the unlawfulness of an act. For reasons we have recounted, it would have been error to give this instruction. Defendant was entitled to have the jury understand the word "knowingly" according to its broader common meaning. That broader meaning allowed the jury to consider whether defendant knowingly presented a claim for payment for the purpose of obtaining greater compensation than that to which he was legally entitled. Since the jury was entitled to use the common meaning of "knowingly," no instruction on the meaning of the term was required sua sponte. (People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639, 51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366.)