Does a federal statute criminalizing "knowingly and willfully" threatening the President constitute a "true threat"?

Among the illustrative cases cited by the Mirmirani court in support of that principle was Watts v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664, in which the United States Supreme Court concluded that a federal statute criminalizing "knowingly and willfully" threatening the President was constitutional on its face. At the same time, however, the Watts court cautioned that a statute which criminalizes a form of pure speech must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind, and a true threat must be distinguished from constitutionally protected speech. (Id., at pp. 706-708, 89 S.Ct. at pp. 1401-1402.)

The defendant's conviction in Watts was set aside because his comments, considered in context, were political hyperbole, not a true threat. Therefore, the court was not required to decide whether a true threat must include the specific intent to carry it into execution. (Watts v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. at pp. 707-708, 89 S.Ct. at pp. 1401-1402.) That question was subsequently decided in another case cited by the Mirmirani court, United States v. Kelner (2d Cir.1976) 534 F.2d 1020.